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Abstract
A surrogate decision maker may conclude that efforts to mechanically provide liquid nourishment would
cause considerable suffering in return for little gain. But such a decision is unquestionably one that can
produce great conflict for families and for medical caregivers. Assessment must be made of each patient's
situation and of the benefits and burdens that will result if tube feeding is withheld or withdrawn. It may well
be, however, that in some cases, the most humane and compassionate treatment for a patient is the withdrawal
of all technological interventions, including those that supply nourishment.
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FEEDING THE PERMANENTLY UNCONSCIOUS 
OR DYING IS NOT ALWAYS COMPASSION 
By Phebe S. Haugen 
O
n March 3 Governor Rudy Per-
pich signed into law the Adult 
Health Care Decisions Act, 
_ making Minnesota the 39th state 
to adopt a Living Will law. The statute 
permits individuals to declare in advance 
what medical treatment they would like in 
the event they become incapable of com-
municating their preferences, and permits 
the designation of a proxy to make health-
care decisions for a declarant. 
The battle over the proposed law was 
waged for six years. While a number of 
provisions fueled the debate, none was as 
controversial as the proposal to permit a 
proxy decision to withdraw artificially ad-
ministered nutrition and hydration from an 
incompetent patient. The specter of pa-
tients who could no longer speak for 
themselves being "starved to death" caus-
ed bitter opposition to the law. Special in-
terest groups lobbied tirelessly against 
what they viewed as the first step down 
the slippery slope to active euthanasia. 
Despite the opposition, the bill arrived 
on the governor's desk with its basic pro-
visions, including those permitting the 
withdrawal of tube feeding, relatively 
unencumbered by qualifications. Its critics 
vow to return another day to try to protect 
the most vulnerable from what they are 
certain represents an inhumane abdication 
of society's responsibility to give basic 
care to the hopelessly ill. 
Are these opponents of the living will 
law correct in their understanding of what 
it means to permit the withdrawal of ar-
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tificially administered nutrition and hydra-
tion? Many think not, although the subject 
is not without controversy, even among 
doctors. Where did it all start? 
In 1976 the parents of Karen Ann 
Quinlan went to court seeking permission 
to remove the respirator that everyone 
believed was keeping her alive. The 
pUblicity generated by the Quinlans' 
agonizing claim to the right to speak on 
their daughter's behalf brought to the 
public's attention the question of how 
The specter of patients 
who could no longer 
speak for themselves 
being "starved to death" 
caused bitter 
opposition to the law. 
much treatment is enough for a patient in 
a hopeless condition, and Who decides for 
someone who can no longer speak for 
herself? 
Before the Quinlans brought the issue to 
the front pages of the world's newspapers, 
such questions were rarely considered by 
anyone other than a patient's family in 
consultation with her doctor. But it was 
not unknown for a doctor and the family 
of a hopelessly ill patient to meet, talk 
quietly together, and determine that for 
their patient, resuscitation would be 
withheld in the event of cardiac arrest, 
mechanical ventilation would not be 
employed to assist breathing, and if 
pneumonia developed, no antibiotics 
would be administered to defeat it. 
After several months of litigation, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court granted the 
Quinlans' petition and affirmed strongly 
that patients and their families, not the 
courts, should make medical treatment 
decisions. In the 13 years since the 
Quinlan decision, many other courts have 
struggled with similar questions, and cer-
tain principles have been fmnly settled: 
A competent adult has the right to refuse 
medical treatment. Any medical interven-
tion may be refused, no matter how 
necessary to the patient's survival. Thus, 
a patient with no kidney function can 
refuse further dialysis treatments, and a 
quadriplegic can insist on removal of the 
ventilator that enables her to breathe and 
the gastrostomy tube that supplies her 
nutrition and hydration; This right of 
autonomous decision is grounded in the 
constitutional right to privacy and the 
common law right to bodily self-
determination. 
A patient who lacks the ability to make 
decisions has the same right as the com-
petent patient to refuse treatment. In this 
situation, the patient's family or guardian 
exercises the right on the patient's behalf, 
and the decision is made on either a 
substituted-judgment or a best-interests 
standard. When substituted judgment is 
employed, the decision maker tries to 
ascertain what the patient would have 
wanted. If that is not possible, an effort is 
made to determine the best interests of the 
patient by balancing the burdens of contin-
uing treatment against the benefits to be 
gained by the intervention, and the 
likelihood that the patient can return to 
cognitive existence. 
Despite problems with the application 
of those standards, in virtually every case 
where a family's decision to end treatment 
has reached the courts, that decision has 
been upheld. It has become commonplace 
to disconnect mechanical ventilators from 
the hopelessly ill. But what if what is 
sought is the withdrawal of artificially ad-
ministered nutrition and hydration? What 
has become so clear in the case of 
respirators is far less certain for tube 
feeding. 
As recently as 20 years ago, patient 
malnutrition inevitably followed from 
illnesses that made normal digestion dif-
ficult or impossible. Today's technol-
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ogies make it possible to give patients 
thousands of calories per day of liquid 
nutrients administered through plastic tub-
ing. Since we can keep patients alive by 
these means, must we always do so? 
Though most courts that have grappled 
with this question have ultimately upheld 
the decision of a surrogate to discontinue 
tube feedings, they have done so on differ-
ing theories and without clear guidelines. 
Why is this such a difficult issue? For 
many, the provision of liquid nutrition is 
ordinary care, while mechanical ventila-
tion, sophisticated cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation techniques, and even an-
tibiotics are viewed as extraordinary and 
therefore not mandatory. 
Others see these latter interventions as 
medical treatment, which may be 
foregone if they are not beneficial or are 
unduly burdensome for the patient, while 
they view the provision of nutrition and 
hydration as basic care which must always 
be maintained. 
The American Medical Association's 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
declared in its opinion on "withholding or 
withdrawing life-prolonging medical 
treatment;' issued in 1986, that artificially 
or technologically supplied nutrition and 
hydration are life prolonging medical 
treatment and as such may be discon-
tinued in proper cases. The Minnesota 
Medical Association has agreed. Still, the 
issue remains troubling and unsettled, 
even among doctors. 
The provision of food and water is of 
great symbolic importance. For many it 
carries religious significance as well. 
When we share a meal, says author 
Frederick Buechner, we meet at the level 
of our most basic need. Joanne Lynn and 
James F. Childress note in "Must Patients 
Always Be Given Food and Water?" (13 
Hastings Center Report 17, October 1983) 
that the act of feeding communicates our 
values in a profound way. We demonstrate 
love, compassion, and concern when we 
give food and drink to another. Feeding 
the newborn is our first and most impor-
tant act to nurture both the new life and 
the relationship we have with it. It re-
mains the primary means by which we 
comfort and sustain the very young and 
vulnerable. 
Still, the mechanical provision of nutri-
tion and hydration has little in common 
with the symbol-laden act of sharing food 
and water. There are two basic systems 
through which such sustenance is provid-
ed. In one, liquids are administered 
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through a naso-gastric tube from the nose 
into the stomach or through a tube 
surgically inserted into the stomach or in-
testine (gastrostomy or jejunostomy). In 
the other, the fluids are delivered in-
travenously by peripheral catheter or 
through a larger catheter inserted direct-
ly into a major vein in the chest. In all its 
forms, the procedures are intrusive, often 
uncomfortable, and carry some risks. 
It is a fundamental ethical principle in 
medicine that interventions that would 
provide no benefit to a patient may be 
withheld, and that if they have been 
begun, they may be withdrawn at the 
point when they no longer help. Are there 
any situations in which we can say that the 
mechanical provision of nutrition and 
hydration is of no real benefit to a patient? 
Lynn and Childress, among others, argue 
that there are three situations when it is 
ethically permissible to forego this in-
tervention: when the procedure would be 
futile to accomplish its goals, when a pa-
tient is permanently unconscious, and 
when the procedures would be dispropor-
tionately burdensome. 
Sometimes procedures 
for providing food and 
drink simply do more 
harm than good. 
In the first case, patients with certain 
conditions, such as serious absorption 
diseases, intestinal cancers, advanced 
congestive heart failure, or severe and ex-
tensive bums will die of their conditions 
no matter what is done. Efforts to provide 
them with nutrients and liquids through 
any of the means described above will 
likely not be effective and may well cause 
added suffering without any benefit. 
The second case, that of permanently 
unconscious patients, raises deep 
philosophic questions for most commen-
tators. The medical reality is that when 
cognitive, sapient life is not possible, in-
terventions that will maintain biological 
life can be of no benefit to the patient. 
There are, however, two lingering ques-
tions. Can we be certain that the un-
consciousness really is permanent, and 
will these patients suffer pain if their 
nutrition and hydration are withdrawn? 
Although the accurate diagnosis of per-
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manent unconsciousness, and particularly 
of the persistent vegetative state is a com-
plicated and sophisticated problem, a 
skilled neurologist can make the diagnosis 
quite reliably today. New diagnostic tools 
have added to the certainty with which the 
condition can be identified. As to the pro-
blem of pain, the American Academy of 
Neurology has taken the unequivocal 
position that the experience of pain is a 
function of consciousness and is not 
possible without the integrated function-
ing of the cerebral cortex and the brain 
stem, functioning that is absent in the per-
manently unconscious patient. (See 
Amicus Curiae Brief, American 
Academy of Neurology, fIled in Brophy v. 
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 39 
Mass 417, 4fJ7 N.E. 2d 626, 1986). 
The third and perhaps the most difficult 
case in which it has been argued that tube 
feedings are of no benefit to a patient is 
when the procedures would be dispropor-
tionately burdensome. Sometimes they 
simply do more harm than good. For the 
severely demented patient who must be 
restrained to be "fed" in this way, the 
whole process can be so terrifying as to 
be cruel. For the end-stage cancer patient, 
there is considerable evidence in the nur-
sing and hospice literature that withdrawal 
of fluids may actually be beneficial. (See, 
for example, Zerwekh, "The Dehydration 
Question" 13 Nursing 47, January 1983). 
It often results in less nausea, less 
pulmonary edema and less confusion. 
This can mean far greater comfort for the 
patient, especially when good nursing 
care and adequate pain control are main-
tained. The deaths that follow in these 
situations, usually within a few days, have 
been reported by families to be peaceful. 
In any of these situations, a surrogate 
decisionmaker may well conclude that ef-
forts to mechanically provide liquid 
nourishment would cause considerable 
suffering in return for little gain. But such 
a decision is unquestionably one that can 
produce great conflict for families and for 
medical caregivers. Assessment must be 
made of each patient's situation and of the 
benefits and burdens that will result if 
tube feeding is withheld or withdrawn. It 
may well be, however, that in some cases, 
the most humane and compassionate 
treatment for a patient is the withdrawal 
of all technological interventions, in-
cluding those that supply nourishm~nt. 
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